Thursday, December 29, 2011. Chaos
and violence continue, Nouri wants the US to fork over weapons to him quickly,
an anonymous State Dept worker ridiculously claims they can protect human rights
in Iraq, the State Dept looks like a national idiot in a press briefing
today, the Turkish military bombs the border and kills 35, and more.
People can make their own decisions on the above and whether or not a
one-time pay off replaces a sense of purpose but money wasn't the only issue.
In the Iraq Inquiry, British officials also raised the issue of the ongoing
(this was at the end of 2009 and throughout 2010) attacks and demonization of
Iraqis as "Ba'athists" and how Bremer set that in motion. That's not addressed
in his remarks to Guy Raz. Nor did Raz raise that issue -- probably too complex
of an issue for an NPR soundbyte. And the Bremer order? Raz ignored that it
wasn't just the military. Technocrats, government workers, they were all
Ba'athists and that's who the order went after. Whether they were guilty of
anything or not. It's how Nouri is still able to hiss "Ba'athist" to this day
and demonize someone.
We'll come back to the US military issue in a moment, but Brememer seems
incapable of taking responsibility for his actions. We call him out here for
what he's done, we do not call him out for the actions of others. In other
words, I was never one of Colin Powell's lowly assistants secretly drooling over
the boss and now spending my entire life on MSNBC chat shows explaining how
groovy and cool Collie is. We don't rewrite history here to give Colin Powell a
clean slate by making Bremer the sole fall guy. Part of what Brememer needs to
take accountability for is creating the problems
Chair John Chilcot: On the contrary, I was planning to offer you
the opportunity
to make your final reflections on this very theme, and you have and
thank you,
but are there other comments or observations you would like to
offer before
we close?
General Michael Walker: Only ones that I -- to try and be helpful
really. I think
the poor old Americans have come in for a lot of criticism, and my
personal
belief was that the biggest mistake that was made over Iraq,
notwithstanding
the decision that you may have made your own minds up about, but it
was the
vice-regal nature of [Paul] Bremer's reign, and I think -- I mean,
I don't want to
be personal about this but that particular six months, I think, set
the scene for
Iraq in a way that we were never going to recover from.
The Inquiry has repeatedly heard from military and diplomatic witnesses
that Paul
Bremer's decision to disband the Ba'ath Party and being de-Ba'athification
was harmful
and too sweeping. were no longer allowed to work for the government.
While some witnesses may (or may not have) been offering statements that
benefitted from hindsight, certainly those who warned Bremer before the policy
was implemented were able to foresee what eventually happened. John Sawers now
heads England's MI6. In 2003, he was the UK's Special Representative in
Baghdad. He shared his observations to the Iraq Inquiry in testimony given on
December 10th:
Committee Member Roderic Lyne: You arrived on 8 May, [head of CPA,
the US' L. Paul] Bremer on the 12th, and within Bremer's first two weeks he had
promulgated two extremely important decisions on de-Ba'athification and on
dissolving the former Iraqi army. Can we look at those two decisions? To what
extent were they Bremer's decisions or -- how had they been pre-cooked in
Washington? I see you have got the Rand Report there, and the Rand Report
suggests there had been a certain interagnecy process in Washington leading to
these decisions, albeit Rand is quite critical of that process. And, very
importantly for us, was the United Kingdom consulted about these crucial
decisions? Was the Prime Minister consulted? Were you consulted? It is pretty
late in the day be then for you to have changed them. Can you take us through
that story.
John Sawers: Can I separate them and deal with de-Ba'athification
first.
Committee Member Roderic Lyne: Yes.
John Sawers: When I arrived in Baghdad on 8 May, one of the
problems that ORHA were facing was that they had been undiscriminating in their
Iraqi partners. They had taken, as their partners, the most senior figures in
the military, in -- not in the military, sorry, in the ministries, in the
police, in institutions like Baghdad University, who happened to be there. And
in several of these instances, Baghdad University was one, the trade ministry
was another, the health ministry, the foreign ministry, the Baghdad police --
the working level were in uproar because they were being obliged to work for the
same Ba'athist masters who had tyrannised them under the Saddam regime, and they
were refusing to cooperate on that basis. So I said, in my first significant
report back to London, which I sent on the Sunday night, the day before Bremer
came back, that there were a number of big issues that needed to be addressed. I
listed five and one of those five was we needed a policy on which Ba'athists
should be allowed to stay in their jobs and which should not. And there was
already a debate going on among Iraqi political leaders about where the line
should be drawn. So I flagged it up on the Sunday evening in my first report,
which arrived on desks on Monday morning, on 11 May. When Bremer arrived late
that evening, he and I had a first discussion, and one of the first things he
said to me was that he needed to give clarity on de-Ba'athification. And he had
some clear ideas on this and he would want to discuss it. So I reported again
early the following monring that this was high on the Bremer's mind and I needed
a steer as to what our policy was. I felt that there was, indeed, an important
need for a policy on de-Ba'athifciation and that, of the various options that
were being considered, some I felt, were more far-reaching than was necessary
but I wasn't an expert on the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and I needed some guidance on
this. I received some guidance the following day, which was helpful, and I used
that as the basis for my discussion with Bremer -- I can't remember if it was
the Wednesday or the Thursday that week but we had a meeting of -- Bremer and
myself and our political teams, where this was discussed, and there was very
strong support among the Iraqi political parties for quite a far-reaching
de-Ba'athification policy. At the meeting itself, I had concerted beforehand
with Ryan Crocker, who was the senior American political adviser, and I said to
him that my guidance was that we should limit the scope of de-Ba'athification to
the top three levels of the Ba'ath Party, which included about 5,000 people, and
that we thought going to the fourth level was a step too far, and it would
involve another 25,000 or so Iraqis, which wasn't necessary. And I thought
Crocker was broadly sympathetic to that approach but at the meeting itself
Bremer set out a strong case for including all four levels, ie the top 30,000
Ba'athists should be removed from their jobs, but there should be a policy in
place for exemptions. I argued the alternative. Actually, unhelpfully, from my
point of view, Ryan Crocker came in in strong support of the Bremer proposal,
and I think he probably smelled the coffee and realised that this was a policy
that had actually already been decided in Washington and there was no point
getting on the wrong side of it. I was not aware of that at that stage and, in
fact, it was only when I subsequently read the very thorough account by the Rand
Corporation of these issues that I realised there had been an extensive exchange
in -- between agencies in Washington.
The US government put exiles in charge and gave them the means to
attack for every real and perceived injustice in the last decades. Of course,
any real injustice would have been done in the early 80s since most of the
exiles -- Nouri al-Malik among them -- fled to other countries then. And lived
in hate and anger year after year, letting it fester and feed. Not everyone.
Some people got on with their lives. But Nouri and Chalabi and so many others
had nothing to offer modern day Iraq but hate. As soon as the US invaded,
that's what those exiles brought back to Iraq and what they've been working
since the US installed them into power.
And that's what the US government -- under Bush, under Barack -- allowed,
encouraged and tried to work to their advantage. It's there in Bremer's column,
it's in Barack's policies as well.
'If only the US military was still present,' Bremer is arguing, 'what we
set in motion and fostered could be handled.' Handled, managed, not
ended.
The US Congress became highly critical of he Iraq War during the Bush
administration. As the American people made calls for the war to be de-funded,
Congress began pressing the White House on where the 'progess' was? Other than
spin, where were the claims of progress? So the White House devised a set of
Benchmarks that the Congress and Nouri al-Maliki all signed off on in early
2007. The only one the government cared about was the one about an oil and gas
law. It's the only one the press cared about as well, the US press, if we're
going to be honest. It's not like the press did editorial afte editorial
lamenting the failure to bring Ba'athists back into the political process. (One
of the benchmarks was to revert Bremer's de-Ba'athification policy, call it
de-de-Ba'athifcation.) So when a weak measure was proposed but never
implemented, the press just focused on the proposal and refused to cover the
lack of follow up.
Senator John McCain argues that Barack's administration purposely tanked
the SOFA extension talks. That's his opinion and he can detail why he feels
that way. That doesn't mean he's correct, only that he's thought it out. What
the record indicates is that Barack's efforts failed. I don't see why you would
jump to the conclusion that this failure was intentional (especially not when
the administration continues negotiations). The pattern is over confidence and
hubris on the part of the administration, and as Greek drama and folklore have
long demonstrated, hubris is followed by a fall. Such as in the fall of 2009
when Barack thought a toothy smile and some oily Chicago charm mixed with his
second-rate celebrity would wow them in Denmark and bring the Olympics to
Chicago in 2016. That didn't happen, did it? There are many other failed
negotiations on record to indicate that the most recent failure by the
administration was only the latest in a series of failures.
And the US government never believed that the US military would leave any
time soon which is why, for example, Chris Hill wasted forever on an oil and
draft law at the expense of elections -- Iraq needed help the elections. The
March 2010 elections were supposed to take place in 2009. Chris Hill was of no
use there. And when oever 500 candidates were banned in 2010, Hill wasn't
leading on addressing that issue nor was the US government.
What the US created in Iraq was the appearance of a new government and the
US military propped it up. As long as there was a strong US military force on
the ground in Iraq, the US had a chance of managing it.
If the US military were to stay nine more years would Iraq be better off?
That's not what the record indicates. The record indicates that the US
government would continue to focus on the oil and gas issue (theft of Iraq's
resources) and undermine democracy, prevent it from taking root.
Look at the State Dept's embarrassing plans. They're not trained for what
they're actually doing. And they're not doing what they're trained in. But
they're going to focus on the police and training the Iraq police. And they're
not qualified. That has nothing to do with the tools of democracy that the
State Dept supposedly has in their tool kit. The priority has never been the
citizenry. It's never been about anything except the tools of a despot.
Nouri cannot be trusted. Take the issue of Camp Ashraf. Not only did he
twice order attacks on the Camp after giving his word to the US government that
he would protect it, he made a deal with the United Nations last week. The
refugees were supposed to be moved to a new location. Yet even with that in
place, there have been non-stop mortar attacks on the Camp. The Camp Nouri is
supposed to protect and that is watched non-stop by Nouri's forces. Today
Reuters reports that the United Nations
is trumpeting the fact that the UN Special Envoy to Iraq, Martin Kobler, spoke
to Nouri today and got a promise that the mortar attacks would cease. Another
promise. From Nouri. Oh, and Iran's
Fars News Agency? They're quoting Nouri's
spokesperson Ali al-Dabbaq is stating that there's been no change in the
deadline for the MEK refugees to leave Iraq. That's very interesting. Not just
because the deal with the United Nations was supposed to have changed that
deadline but also because the original deadline -- the one the Iraqi goverment
now says has not changed -- is this Saturday.
In that context,
UPI's report, is all the more
troubling: "The United States plans to go ahead with a nearly $11 billion sale
of arms and training to Iraq despite concerns about the country's future,
officials said."
The Council on Foreign Relations'
Bernard Gwertzman interviewed Ned Parker (
Los Angeles Times)
about Iraq yesterday and we'll again note this section:
[Bernard Gwertzman]: You've been living in Iraq on and
off since the war began in 2003. What's the United States' influence there since
the departure of the troops?
[Ned Parker]: America has influence. Evidently, it's
less, given that [the] troops have left, but America still has much soft power
from the sales of weapons to Iraq, the need of Iraqi counterterrorism forces to
work with U.S. Special Forces. Then there's the issue of America helping Iraq
with investment, getting foreign companies in, and the issue of ending Iraq's
Chapter Seven status at the UN, which prevents Iraq from having its full
sovereignty because Iraq continues to pay reparations to Kuwait. So there are
many ways that the United States can help Iraq. In terms of influence, it's a
question of how America uses it and how it leverages it. Even when America had
U.S. forces in Iraq, particularly in the last three years, America has been very
reluctant to use its influence or clout to the maximum.
Despite
all the turmoil Nouri is creating, the US immediately rushes forward to insist
that the arms deal is still on. Even though it is one of the few levers they
currently have over Nouri al-Maliki. Over the weekend, Nouri began insisting
that the deal go through more quickly. What's changed since his trip to DC
earlier this month? The political crisis he's created for one. He's charged
Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi with terrorism, he's asked that Saleh al-Mutlaq
be stripped of his office (Deputy Prime Minister) and this follows hundreds of
arrests in recent weeks of various Sunni figures. al-Hashemi and al-Mutlaq are
both Sunni. They are also members of Iraqiya, the political slate that came in
first in the elections.
Michael S. Schmidt and Eric Schmitt (New York
Times) report that the weapons are alarming to some people:
[. . .] Iraqi politicians and analysts, while acknowledging that
the American military withdrawal had left Iraq's borders, and airspace,
vulnerable, said there were many reasons for concern.
Despite pronouncements from American and Iraqi officials that the
Iraqi military is a nonsectarian force, they said, it had evolved into a
hodgepodge of Shiite militias more interested in marginalizing the Sunnis than
in protecting the country's sovereignty. Across the country, they said, Shiite
flags -- not Iraq's national flag -- fluttered from tanks and military vehicles,
evidence, many said, of the troops' sectarian allegiances.
Instead of using a tool for negotiations, the administration
immediately rushes to assure, "Yes, despot, we will be granting you all the
weapon power you need for a full-scale blood bath." In addition, there's the
issue of why in the world would the US arm a questionable leader who appears to
be demonizing and attacking 20% of his country's population or when three
political blocs (Iraqiya, the Sadr bloc and the Kurdish bloc) are all calling
for new elections and a withdrawal of confidence in the
government.
Just understand my frustration. We want to normalize a
government that really doesn't exist.
That's not me, that's Joe Biden,
before he was vice president, back when he was in the Senate and chaired the
Foreign Relations Committee, from an
April 10, 2008 hearing on
Iraq.
What else did he say in that hearing?
That
the US was being asked "to take sides in Iraq's civil war" and that "there is no
Iraqi government that we know of that will be in place a year from now -- half
the government has walked out." And currently? Iraqiya is not attending
Parliament meetings as a result of the abuses of Nouri al-Maliki.
Now the
US government already made a huge mistake, the administration of Barack Obama,
by refusing to honor the will of the Iraqi people as well as the Iraqi
Constitution. March 2010, Iraqis showed up at the polls and voted. This followed
Nouri demonizing Iraqiya and using the Justice and Accountability Commission to
disqualify Iraqiya candidates, Nouri using his control of state media to ensure
that no one received better coverage (soft and glossy) than did he himself and
his political slate (State of Law).
Despite that and despite predictions
that State of Law would win by a landslide, that didn't happen. The Iraqi people
voted and their first choice was Iraqiya. That was true even after Nouri stamped
his feet and demanded recounts. This was true even after the electoral
commission tried to humor him by taking some votes away from
Iraqiya.
Iraqiya was the winner. This was not in question, this was not
in dispute.
Per the people and per the Constitution, April 2010 should
have seen Iraqiya attempting to form a government, one most likely led by the
head of Iraqiya, Ayad Allawi.
Instead, Nouri dug his heels in and for 8
months refused to budge. His term was over and the people had spoken. They
were then choosing a national identity and rejecting sectarianism. It was a
great moment for Iraqis. But the US refused to celebrate that moment, instead
they worked to sabotage it by backing Nouri.
And this despite all they knew about the secret prisons he'd be running
since 2006 -- plural, secret prisons, plural -- and they backed him despite
knowing he was ordering torture. They backed him despite
the February 2009 State Dept cable written by
then-US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker which noted he was being seen
as the "new Saddam" that he "tends to view everyone and everything with
instinctive suspicion." Crocker noted, "The concentration of authority in
Maliki's Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC), the establishment of an elite
security force - with its own judges and detention facilities - that reports
directly to the PM, the creation of a security force command that short-circuits
provincial authority, a willingness in some cases to use strong-arm tactics
against political adversaries, and patronage networks to co-opt others all
follow a very familiar pattern of Arab world leadership." Here's some
foreshadowing from Crocker, "While responsibility for the lack of political
consensus is broadly shared among Iraq's leaders from all groups, the PM needs
to set the tone. Here, Maliki has shown
that he is either unwilling or unable
to take the lead in the give-and-take needed to build broad consensus for the
Government's policies among competing power blocs." And to demonstrate just how
much the US government actively refuses to grasp what's at stake, we'll note
this from Anna Mulrine (Christian Science
Monitor):
A top US military official still on the
ground in Iraq, under the auspices of the State Department, discounts such
concerns, saying safeguards are in place to prevent such an outcome – and that
all military sales include monitoring "to make sure the [Iraqi] government isn't
in violation of human rights."
That is laughable. As reporters have been tortured in Iraq this year,
that is laughable. It also, pay attention, calls into question Iraq's supposed
'independence' if the US has that 'power.' But it was topped in
today's State Dept press briefing by Victoria Nuland.
QUESTION: To Iraq --
weapons sales? Has there been discussion in this building with any Iraqi
officials about whether or not they're meeting the conditions for these armed
sales to go ahead?
MS. NULAND: I can't speak to that. As you know, our main focus has
been in trying to encourage the Iraqi political groups to talk to each other and
to create a broad national dialogue about the way forward. With regard to the
arms sales, these, as you know, are long planned and they're part of the
transition process for the Iraqis to manage their own security within their own
resources.
QUESTION: Just -- wait. How are those efforts going to promote
dialogue? It's been a few days that that's been the same message, yet there
hasn't seemed to be a palpable effect yet in Iraq. Can you shed some light on
how you're going about this and what tangible results that's
producing?
MS. NULAND: Well, as you know, the Vice President has been active
in his personal diplomacy with individual Iraqi leaders. Our Ambassador Jim
Jeffrey has seen and talked to all of the major figures in Iraq. We're
encouraging a process that a number of them have begun talking about, which is
to have a sit down, to have a dialogue among themselves soon after the new year.
And we have seen some encouraging public statements by a few of them over the
last couple of days indicating they also believe that a national dialogue needs
to take place soon after the new year.
QUESTION: Do you think -- okay. Do you think certain actions need
to be taken before this -- to really kick-start this dialogue, such as
withdrawing charges against rival politicians, things of this
nature?
MS. NULAND: I think we're not going to get into the middle of this
and dictate one way or the other. It -- clearly the Iraqi political groups need
to sit down together and work this through in a manner that is consistent with
Iraq's constitution and their commitments to each other.
QUESTION: I understand, but can certain -- for example, just
logistically, can politicians -- certain leaders sit down when they're
essentially wanted individuals? How does that work?
MS. NULAND: Well, I assume you're talking about one individual
who's now the subject of charges. Again, we've said all along that we want to
see any judicial process take place within the contest of the Iraqi constitution
and meet international judicial standards. We need to get the main groups in
Iraq talking to each other again about how they can move forward.
QUESTION: But in this case, you agree with the need for a judicial
process to take place? You don't think that is not necessary?
MS. NULAND: Again, we're not the judge and jury here. This is an
issue that needs to be settled by Iraqis within Iraqi constitutional
processes.
QUESTION: You said you've seen encouraging signs. What are those
signs?
MS. NULAND: We've had -- we've seen some Iraqis speak publicly
about their desire for national dialogue, and a number of them are also
expressing the same hope to us privately that soon after the New Year, they'll
be able to sit down and settle this properly.
Comical and so sad. The US State Dept whoring for a despot. And
pretending that those victimized by the despot calling for talks is a sign of
progress. Nouri, the one who started the crisis, hasn't called for talks. But
pretend not to notice anything that the US government doesn't want you to see,
apparently.
Aswat al-Iraq quotes Kurdistan Regional
Government President Massoud Barzani stating that the political crisis is "the
most dangerous among other crisis that took place in Iraq since 2003" and
expressing his fear that civil war could break out.
James Zogby (Middle East Online) notes a Zogby poll
of Iraqis on their various political leaders:
We asked Iraqis to evaluate their leaders and
found that most are polarizing figures. Iraqi List coalition Iyad Allawi has the
best overall rating of any Iraqi political figure receiving strong support from
Sunni Arabs and Kurds. He, however, is not viewed favorably by Shia Arabs. The
current Prime Minister, Nuri al Maliki, is more polarizing with quite limited
support from Sunni Iraqis and Kurds. In fact his numbers across the board are
strikingly similar to those received by cleric, Moqtada al Sadr, except that al
Sadr does better among Shia, and receives approximately the same ratings as al
Maliki among Sunni Arabs and only slightly worse among
Kurds.
27 years of the Turkish government doing the same thing and getting no
change in results. You really think the answer is better hardware? By refusing
to grant Kurds full inclusion in Turkey, the government created the PKK. All the
bullets and bombs in the world won't kill it. The only way you do away with the
PKK is take away the reason they were created by bringing the Kurds in Turkey
into the political process and making them citizens with full equality.
